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Abstract: The context for this paper is evidence-based practice (EBP). EBP is about production of desirable change.
The evidence should come from randomized controlled trials (RCTs). To make sense of RCT evidence it must be
placed in an argument structure. I compare two different models, Toulmin and Cartwright, and investigate whether
the two models can be merged into one. I shall argue that such merging is not feasible.
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1. Introduction
In many areas of life there are political demands for better research bases to inform and guide
policy and practice. This demand is grounded in an impeccable what works logic: we wish to
bring about desirable results and prevent undesirable results, and this is better achieved if our
actions are guided by evidence of what actually works. Researchers respond to this demand in
many ways; some by producing the kind of evidence it is assumed can serve as a base for
practice, others by fleshing out practical guidelines. Some researchers respond by criticizing or
even rejecting the whole enterprise of EBP, often because of worries about restrictions in the
freedom of professionals to exercise their judgment.
The term ‘evidence-based’ obviously draws attention to evidence. Epistemologists seem
to agree that the term ‘evidence’ refers to that which serves to confirm or disconfirm a claim
(hypothesis, belief, theory) (e.g., Achinstein, 2001). The main function of evidence can thus be
summed up in the word support: evidence speaks to the truth or the trustworthiness of a claim.
One big question is therefore whether evidential support of a hypothesis is identical to the
hypothesis being based on the evidence. That is to say, what role does the evidence actually play
in EBP. Another much debated question concerns the kind of evidence EBP can or should use.
EBP is often criticized for involving an evidence hierarchy which ranks quantitative data at the
top and professional judgment and personal experience near the bottom (e.g., Oancea & Pring,
2008). I shall side-step this question, just note the following: in EBP the evidence is meant to be
research-based and quantitative; ideally it should emanate from randomized controlled trials
(RCTs). This makes good sense in EBP, given the fact that EBP is deeply causal and concerns
the production of desired results (or the prevention of undesired results)—for short, we do X and
we get result Y. The RCT is a research design which is well suited to distinguish between
correlation and causation, which of course is of paramount interest to a what works logic.
I shall simply take as my point of departure that the evidence we have in EBP is
quantitative, emanates from RCTs and speaks to the truth value of a causal hypothesis of the
form “X leads to Y”. If X actually does lead to Y, which is our desired result, we say that X
works. If it does not lead to Y, then we say that X does not work. But if the evidence speaks to
the truth value of a causal hypothesis, what if anything does it mean to say that practice is based
on this evidence? In more general terms; what is the relation between evidence and practice?
Bondy, P., & Benacquista, L. (Eds.). Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11 th International
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18-21 May 2016. Windsor, ON: OSSA,
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This paper is about different ways of understanding the role that evidence plays (or can
play) for practice in EBP. To figure out what that role is, we have to place evidence in a model; a
model in this case being an argument structure. I shall discuss and compare two such models:
Stephen Toulmin’s argument model (Toulmin, 2003) and Nancy Cartwright’s evidence-in-use
model (Cartwright, 2011, 2012; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012). Both models accommodate RCT
evidence, but their structure is different. In Section 2 I describe the models, and in Section 3 I
draw out their similarities and differences. In Section 4 I shall discuss whether it is possible to
merge the two models and thus capitalize on their good features while avoiding any
shortcomings they might have. It might sound paradoxical, but I shall argue that in this case the
two models are better left unmerged.
2. Two models of evidence: Toulmin and Cartwright
It is important to my overall argument in this paper that EBP is practical. It is goal-directed and
concerns what we should do, not what we should believe. Hence, EBP is not really about finding
causes. It is about using causes in practice to produce a change of a more or less specified
magnitude in some specified entity or situation; for example to make students more proficient
readers during first grade, or improve certain aspects of people’s character.
How does RCT evidence help us do that? Before I dive into Toulmin and Cartwright I
would like to briefly inquire into a third model which will provide a useful contrast. This is
Philip Davies’ (1999) much cited rendering of EBP (or EBE, as he calls it: evidence-based
education). Davies is a defender of EBP, and here is what he thinks educational practitioners
should do (Davies 1999, p. 109):
-

Pose an answerable question;
Know where and how to find evidence;
Retrieve, read, and critically appraise the evidence;
Organize and grade the power of the evidence;
Determine its relevance to their educational needs and environments.

This is Davies’ definition of EBP. Implicitly it also provides a model for the function of
evidence. It is useful to have this model as a backdrop, for two reasons: it highlights orthodox
EBP reasoning about evidence, and it provides an instructive contrast to my two selected models.
However, Davies’ (1999) model shares a common feature with the Toulmin (2003) and
Cartwright (2011, 2012; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012) models: they all begin with an answerable
question, and the relevance of the evidence must be determined locally, by the practitioner. But
there the likenesses end. There is no mention of the causal claim that the evidence is evidence for
in Davies’ model, rather the model centers on evidence which is to be retrieved, appraised,
organized, and its relevance determined. It therefore seems that Davies thinks that the answer to
the question can be read directly off the evidence. Thus, that the practice is in a very direct sense
based on evidence. I think this is a misunderstanding: evidence is made up of quantitative data,
and you do not base practice on that. You base practice on an idea that if we do X, we are likely
to get Y as a result. Nevertheless, adherents to EBP tend to assume that evidence is directly
relevant for practice and even sometimes speak about implementing the evidence. In a similar
vein, but cast negatively, critics say that “based” implies that the evidence─practice relationship
is one of derivation, like an algorithm that allows you to extract a practice or a policy from the
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evidence, leaving no room for professional judgment (e.g., Biesta, 2007). Advocates and critics
alike thus tend to assume that the evidence─practice relation is direct, such that practice can be
derived from or read off the evidence.
This is what we are up against, then: to find a better, more adequate model for the role
that RCT evidence can play for practice, given that it is not a direct relationship. You do not
derive a practice from RCT data. Practice is based on the causal claim (X  Y) that the evidence
is evidence for.
Both Toulmin’s argument model and Cartwright’s evidence-in-use model accommodate
RCT evidence, and both cast it in an indirect role, as opposed to Davies’ model outlined above.
Let me begin with the Toulmin (2003) model. What I shall present here is an adaptation of
Toulmin’s argument model. That is to say, I keep the model intact, but I change its use somewhat
by putting it in the service of practical reasoning. This is because EBP is practical in nature.
Toulmin’s model is like a spiral of ever more considerations added as the argumentative
need arises. He begins by distinguishing between the claim or conclusion (C) that we wish to
establish and the facts we appeal to as a foundation for C, called grounds or data (D) (p. 90). The
question “how did you get there” is directed at the step from D to C and how this step can be
justified. Propositions that provide the justification for inferring C from D are called warrants
(W) (Toulmin, 2003, p. 91). As David Hitchcock (2003) puts it, the warrant licences the
inference. Warrants confer different degrees of strength on the claims that they justify; hence we
may need to use a qualifier (Q) to express this: necessarily, probably, possibly, etc. Rebuttals
(R), often expressed as “unless”, point to exceptional circumstances which undermine the
general authority of the warrant. Both Q and R thus have a bearing on W. Next we come to a
central concern: whether the warrant is acceptable at all. Suppose you insist that it is reasonable
to think (W) that some C follows from some D and somebody says “but why on earth do you
think that?”. This is where backing (B) of the warrant enters the picture, and with it an indirect
role for research evidence. “Standing behind our warrants, […], there will normally be other
assurances, without which the warrants themselves would possess neither authority nor
currency,” Toulmin (2003, p. 96) says.
Toulmin’s model, as he describes it, is about defending claims against challenges—the
model lays out a pattern of justification of beliefs. As I indicated above I am putting the model in
a practical EBP context and I therefore change the basic question from “how should I defend this
claim” to “what should I do”. With this shift a story of the following sort emerges: Suppose I am
a teacher; I observe that some of my first-graders are lagging behind in their reading (D), and I
tell my colleague that I should give them some extra word and phonological training (C). But
why do you want to do that, my colleague asks, inquiring after how I get from D to C. Different
warrants (W) are possible here. For example, it seems to have worked okay with other children,
or somebody said it’s a good strategy.
Let us pause here briefly and take a closer look at D, which is also a form of evidence –
evidence on the basis of which you form an idea about what you should do. So is this not
practice based directly on evidence after all? In one way it is, since D admittedly comprises
evidence. But this is practice-based evidence, picked up from practice on a daily basis; from
observations, tests, interactions and intuitions, and leading to a judgment that my students are
reading-delayed. This is not research-based RCT evidence and thus not the kind of evidence that
EBP is supposed to employ. But granted, it serves as a starting point.
Research-based evidence comes into play in the Toulmin (2003) model, I argue, when
somebody problematizes the W and queries the justification of the D─C step: are you sure that
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extra phonological training will help? In passing, note the causation involved here: we do extra
phonological training, and it will (hopefully) lead to better reading skills in the targeted students.
Standing behind and backing up the warrant in backing B: yes, I feel confident that phonological
training will work, because there are three solid RCTs showing the effect of phonological
training for reading-delayed students. Thus, research-based evidence plays an indirect role; it
helps you justify your conclusion to do C. This is also what the epistemologists tend to say: the
main function of evidence is that of support of a hypothesis. In this case what is supported is a
conclusion to implement a certain strategy. The evidence supports it, but does not tell you how to
do it. You cannot derive your practice from it.
We have to cover some ground before we can look at Cartwright’s (2011, 2012;
Cartwright & Hardie, 2012) evidence-in-use model. I said above that EBP is causal in nature.
Cartwright’s model of evidence is based on a certain understanding of causation; namely that
causes (at least in the EBP context) are best understood as INUS-conditions. To make a long
causal story short, the INUS approach tells us that results or outcomes are not produced by one
single cause, but have contributions from different sources. This sounds commonplace, but is
easily forgotten. We tend to look for the cause and if we implement an intervention it is only
natural that this intervention is salient for us and that we therefore ignore other factors. But the
overall effect on Y depends on how all these factors add up. The gist of the INUS approach is
thus that an intervention X is part of a team of causes and enabling factors which work together
to produce Y.
The second presupposition for Cartwright’s (2011, 2012; Cartwright & Hardie, 2012)
model is that causal connections are local. We cannot simply export a causal connection, insert it
into a different context and expect it to work there. Contexts are different, students are different,
teachers are different, curricula are different, headmasters are different, parents are different, and
school cultures are different. So if an RCT shows that X works well (produces desired results)
with reading-delayed children in Exeter, why should I think that X will work for my readingdelayed students in Oslo?
The question at issue in the Cartwright model is thus an effectiveness prediction: will X
work here, were I to implement it? That is what practitioners want evidence for; whether a given
intervention is worth implementing in their local context. The RCT evidence is indirectly
relevant to this question, because it tells you that X has worked somewhere, but in itself it does
not tell you that it will also work here, since here is different from there. It can however be made
relevant to whether X will work here, if we collect a number of other facts and evidences and put
them all together into an argument structure. That is to say: what kind of premises do we need if
the conclusion is to be “yes, extra word and phonological training will in all likelihood work
here, for my students”? This is precisely what Cartwright’s evidence-in-use model tells us: what
I must provide to make the RCT evidence relevant to my conclusion and take us from there to
here (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012, p. 133).
Conclusion: Yes, X will in all likelihood work if I implement it here (or no, it will
not).
Premise 1: The INUS approach says that X does not work alone but is part of a
larger constellation of factors and enablers. The support factors for X are a, b and
c. These are necessary for X to be able to do its work.
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Premise 2: The causal support factors a, b and c are indeed in place here. If they
are not, they can be easily procured.
Premise 3: X can play a causal role here.
These are the three major premises in Cartwright and Hardie’s evidence-in-use model.
But where is the RCT evidence? Its role appears only when we begin to examine the premises
and look into the next layer down. Below each major premise are the premises in the subarguments that support the major premise. Below each of those again are the premises of the subsub-argument that supports the sub-argument. One of the sub-arguments for major premise 3 is
that X played a causal role somewhere. And how do we know that X helped produce Y there?
Because there exists an RCT that shows it. Thus, the RCT serves to back up a sub-premise or is a
premise of a sub-argument (Cartwright and Hardie describe it in both ways). Whichever way we
choose to describe it, the RCT evidence plays an indirect role for the conclusion.
To return to the conclusion: we see that it requires heterogeneous evidence, from RCTs to
various facts on the ground. I put all these pieces of heterogeneous evidence together and I make
the judgment that yes, all in all I believe that X has a good chance to work here.
3. Comparing the models
At the outset I judge both Toulmin and Cartwright’s models to be more adequate than the model
we can extract from Philip Davies’ five steps, for the reason that Davies (1999) casts research
(RCT) evidence in a direct role in relation to practice. A good many advocates and critics of EBP
in education do the same; they think that ‘based’ signifies that practice is somehow derived or
extracted from the evidence (e.g., Biesta, 2007). I have argued that you cannot derive practice
from quantitative data, and that the evidence actually speaks to the truth value of the causal claim
that X brings about Y. The practice (teaching method) is based on this claim, not on the evidence
supporting the claim.
Toulmin and Cartwright’s models alike cast research (RCT) evidence in an indirect role.
The models provide different argument structures, but in this particular respect they obtain the
same result. But there the likenesses stop.
Before we proceed, let me reiterate the point that the Toulmin (2003) model as I employ
it here is an adaptation—his model was not constructed to answer the question of what one
should do, but the question of how to defend claims. It accommodates RCT evidence very nicely,
but backing B was not constructed to do that specifically—B comprises various considerations
that back up and secure our warrants. Cartwright’s model, on the other hand, is expressly
constructed to accommodate RCT evidence in an EBP context. A comparison of the two might
therefore seem unfair, but is nevertheless worthwhile.
Let us begin by looking at the shape of the models. Toulmin’s (2003) model is like a
spiral with ever wide circles, running on its own internal drive by questions which come
naturally as the argument develops (“how do you get from D to C”, “how do you know that
phonological training helps?”, etc.). The model is easily employed; it guides you through a spiral
that allows you to look at one thing at a time, and you do not get lost in its complexity because
there are no sub-sub-premises. The model shows a very sensible role for RCT evidence, namely
as backing B. My initial feeling is that our practical reasoning toward a decision about what to do
will be clearer and better justified if we employ this model. Cartwright’s model is a classical
model with premises and conclusion and is built up like a pyramid. The conclusion on top is
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supported by major premises, which are supported by sub-argument premises, which again are
supported by sub-sub-argument premises, etc. (Cartwright & Hardie, 2012, p. 17). The role
ascribed to RCT evidence is that of a sub-argument premise (also described as a sub-subpremise). The pyramid, as I understand it, has both a general and a specific point. The general
point is the importance of always backing up one’s premises. This is more than just a selfevident statement; it also points to the direction of the reasoning here. We begin at the top, with a
conclusion concerning the likelihood that X will work here. Then we work our way downward in
the pyramid, by mapping major premises, then securing these premises with new ones, and so on
and so forth. The specific point concerns RCT, and is the idea that RCT evidence speaks to the
claim that X worked there, which I suggested above is the first premise in an EBP argument to
the conclusion that it is likely (or not) that a given intervention will work here. However, given
that the argument pyramid is built up of premises, sub-premises, sub-sub-premises, premises
backing up sub-arguments, etc., the structure branches out down through the levels and gets
enormously complex. The layers may be difficult to keep track of. On the other hand, if we get it
right, it does put order into our adduced reasons and it does help us assess the degree of
confidence we should have in our conclusion—just how likely is it that X will work here?
Second, let us look at point of departure for the reasoner. Toulmin’s model of practical
reasoning begins right where the practitioners are: in practice, facing problems to be solved.
Much reasoning about what one should do is set off by perceptions or felt problems in practice;
for example the observation that some students are reading-delayed. This is what Michael Eraut
(2004) terms “practice-based evidence” (p. 92) and I propose to understand it in terms of data D.
Practice-based evidence and its important role in professional contexts is, I argue, amply
captured by the D─C connection in the Toulmin model. This model thus encapsulates what I
take to be two of the most important elements of practitioners’ reasonings; what the problem is
(or what I take it to be) and what I should do. For that very reason I guess the model would be
attractive to employ, especially when coupled with its internal spiral drive which guides the
reasoner from issue to issue.
Cartwright’s model starts with a different question, namely an effectiveness prediction:
will X work here? But where does that question come from? Practitioners who are using
Cartwright’s model begin at a very different place. They are not wondering how to solve a
particular problem (whether relating to “clients” or not); rather they have a ready-made X at their
hands and have to decide whether to implement it. Where does this X come from if the
practitioners do not devise it themselves? It comes from various “warehouses” such as What
Works Clearinghouses that conduct meta-analyses and vet interventions and advise you to
choose interventions backed by good evidence. This is recognizable from Davies’ model
outlined above, with the exception that his model omits the all-important X; that which is to be
implemented to produce desired results. But how does this situation look like on the ground, so
to speak? I have no doubt that practitioners sometimes find themselves in situations with an
already existing X. What, then, are their options? My guess is that most practitioners take it for
granted that “it worked there” automatically means “it works in general” which in turn
automatically means “it will work here”. If so, they do not see the necessity of running through
an argument pyramid, but just implement X. Actually they may not have a choice—the decision
to implement X may not even be theirs; it may be made by the local government. But that is
another issue.
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There is nothing in Cartwright’s model; it seems to me, which plays the same role as D
does in Toulmin’s model. Toulmin’s model thus accommodates practice-based evidence, and
Cartwright’s model does not.
Third, let us look more closely at the RCT evidence. As suggested above, both Toulmin
and Cartwright’s models provide an indirect role for RCT evidence, but there are subtle
differences between them. To see this, we have to look at what RCT evidence tells us. The
privileging of RCT evidence is a characteristic feature of EBP and much criticized, since it
implies that other kinds of evidence that are important in practice (for example professional
judgment or personal experience) are under-valued. However, the privileging can be justified in
the case of EBP, because what we want here is evidence that speaks to the truth value of a causal
hypothesis, not just any hypothesis. In RCTs we compare groups that are the same with respect
to all relevant (causal) factors except one: the intervention. Random assignment is supposed to
ensure that the groups have the same distribution of properties and factors. The standard result of
an RCT is a treatment effect, generally expressed in terms of effect size: average effect in
treatment group minus average effect in control group. We assume that the difference between
the groups needs a causal explanation, and since all other factors (supposedly) are equally
distributed we infer that the treatment, our intervention X, is the cause of the outcome. X works,
we might be tempted to conclude.
RCTs are strong on internal validity. If we obtain an average positive result and the
conditions of the trial are met, we may safely believe the causal claim in question. Doing X
indeed leads to Y, and the evidence shows it. But internal validity is purchased at the expense of
external validity, or generality. As Cartwright (2007) argues, what RCT evidence shows is
strictly speaking that the X─Y relation holds where the trial was conducted, for that particular
study group. It holds there. But the fact that it holds there is not itself evidence that the X─Y
relation holds generally across differing contexts, even though we seem to presuppose that it
does—somehow we seem to think that if an RCT shows a causal connection, this causal
connection holds simpliciter and simply exists everywhere. Hence, we tend to think that if
something worked there, it will also work here. This assumption certainly seems to underlie
Philip Davies’ (1999) model of evidence as well as the practical guidelines produced by What
Works Clearinghouses (often based on many theres).
This limitation of RCT evidence is really not discussed in the EBP literature, with the
exception of Nancy Cartwright. We therefore should not wonder that her evidence-in-use model
is developed to take account of precisely this limitation. If causes do not hold simpliciter, then
they do not work generally. Then how do we make what worked there relevant to the question of
whether it (X) will work here? We look at the context. Causal connections are not general;
instead they are dependent on contextual factors for their workings. Causal connections,
Cartwright says, only hold ceteris paribus. Hence, to make a judgment whether X will work
here, we have to collect information about the necessary contextual factors, the causal support
team: what the support factors are, whether they are at hand or whether they can be procured if
necessary. This is expressed in her major premises.
This works (sic) differently on the Toulmin model. Suppose I observe that some of my
first-graders are reading-delayed. That is my diagnosis of the situation, D, and I infer that the
children should receive extra phonological training, C. On my colleague’s query I state that
phonological training is a well tried remedy, W. But how do you know that it will work, my
colleague asks—that is, he is asking for backing of my warrant. So I refer to an RCT (Hatcher et
al., 2006) which shows that compared with the control group, children who received this this
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intervention for two consecutive 10-week periods made significant progress on letter knowledge,
single word reading and phoneme awareness. This is RCT evidence as backing B, and its relation
to my decision is indirect. But, and here is the current crux of the matter, it is natural to think and
speak of it as general. Why do I think X will work with my students? Because an RCT (probably
more than one, too) shows that X works. When I reason my way through Toulmin’s spiral, I then
come to this point: In order for the RCT to be able to serve as B and justify our warrant, I am
forced into treating it as yielding general results. This is in accordance with widespread beliefs
about RCT results, but given their research design they actually yield results limited to the study
group. Thus it might seem that on the Toulmin model it comes naturally to think of RCT results
as general; thereby providing an easy bridge to “X will work here”, but at the same time
misunderstanding what the evidence tells us. But then Toulmin’s model has a trick up its sleeve;
qualifiers Q and rebuttals R. That is to say, we should run through the entire spiral and not just
stop at B. Q and R both speak to the bearing of W on the inference from D to C; qualifiers by
indicating the strength of the warrant, and rebuttals by pointing to possible conditions of
exception. Hatcher and his colleagues state explicitly that there are exceptions; a full 25% of the
children did not respond to the intervention and this non-responsiveness is tentatively explained
in terms of the children’s pre-existing knowledge and skills (2006, p. 825). A piece of practical
reasoning running through the Toulminian spiral might sound like this: Some of my students are
reading-delayed (D), and unless they have extremely low initial scores on word recognition and
letter knowledge (R), they will presumably (Q) respond well to word and phonological training
(C), since this is a well-tried remedy for reading-delayed children (W); the warrant being backed
by sound RCT evidence (B).
What is happening here? With Q and R we have introduced flexibility and probability
into the model, but the conditions of exceptions as I have worked them out here, do not apply to
B. Thus, the RCT evidence still comes through as being general, at least in how we express this
kind of reasoning linguistically. The exceptionality has a different source. Hatcher et al. (2006)
locate it in the students; the non-responsiveness of students is explained by the students being
below the cut-off point where the intervention becomes useful. It is difficult to gauge how they
understand the causation involved in their study, but my guess is they understand it as simpliciter
and general (since that is what most researchers seem to do…). If you were to implement their
intervention in your classroom and fail to attain Y, the failure would be understood to be about
the “material” and not about the limited external validity of RCTs and/or the absence of a proper
causal support team. Cartwright’s plea for premises to take us from there to here seems difficult
to accommodate in Toulmin’s model.
To sum up, the two models share one central feature: they both cast RCT evidence in an
indirect role. This is vital if we are to understand the role of RCT for EBP at all. Casting it in a
direct role, as many advocates and critics alike do, leads to understanding the evidence─practice
relation as one of derivation, which is clearly not feasible. But since we are discussing the
possibilities of merging the models, perhaps the differences are of more interest. I have argued
that they answer different questions: “what should I do” and “will X work here”. I conjecture
that practitioners, whose job it is to produce desired results, whether by implementing a readymade X or devising an intervention themselves, might find Toulmin’s model attractive because it
speaks directly to issues that are within their power of control, namely what they themselves
should do. Toulmin’s model also accommodates what is known in the (educational) EBP
literature as “practice-based evidence”; Cartwright’s model has no place for that. Cartwright’s
model includes premises to take us from there to here, Toulmin’s does not. This particular issue
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also touches the restrictions of RCT evidence and the idea that causal X─Y relations hold locally
but not simpliciter. The restricted reach of RCT evidence is not accommodated in Toulmin’s
model; as backing B it must be general to serve its purpose for the decision to be made.
Toulmin’s model explicitly incorporates exceptions (R) but I am not sure if (or how) that helps to
solve the problem. Finally, Toulmin’s model, with its internal drive, is user-friendly and might
appeal more to practitioners than Cartwright’s more complicated model.
4. Merging the models?
Each model has strengths and weaknesses and I confess I like them both. Now, if we merge
them, can we get the best of both worlds? Can we get a model that speaks to practitioners, has an
internal logical drive, accommodates practice-based evidence, understands the role of RCT
evidence as indirect, accommodates causes as INUS conditions, allows the restricted stretch of
RCT designs and provides room for contextual evidence that takes us from there to here?
In my professional domain, which is education, models are combined fast and easy.
Concerning, for example, didactical models, many textbooks I read as a student began by
showing two or three very different models; behaviorist, cognitivist and constructivist models.
Then it was argued, quite correctly, that all models taken in isolation are oversimplified and only
present a partial picture of the phenomenon. The conclusion would be that all models integrated
or combined into one is the solution—the new model supposedly representing a (more) holistic
picture of didactics (for example Gundem, 1983). My initial experience with model combination
thus taught me that it is no big deal; they can simply be “added” together. The complexity which
inevitably resulted was generally interpreted to indicate a holistic understanding, and holistic
understanding was seen as an undisputed good. As a student I became skeptical of model
combinations because of the sheer ease with which it was done.
But my textbook experience is perhaps more about adding models, piling them on top of
each other, rather than merging them, and presumably things have happened in the field of
didactics since then. I take the term model merging from Brunet et al. (2006), who take it to
signify the combination of information from several models into a single model (p.1). That is to
say, one does not (necessarily) take whole models and “add” everything in them, one takes
certain entities and/or relations from each model and combines them into a new model. This is
not a matter of conjunction of models or of linking them, but a matter of performing certain
operations on them and putting the entities together again in a different way.
There are obviously many different ways of merging models. Some prefer the term
ensemble methods (Banerjee & Bandyopadhyay, 2013; Opitz & Maclin, 1999) and some prefer
the term cascade methods (Heitz et al., n.d.). These have been studied in many domains, but to
the best of my knowledge not in argumentation (or in education, for that matter). There are
different approaches and the requirements and underlying assumptions of these approaches may
differ significantly. In these circumstances we have to be very careful about which if any insights
we may extract from them and apply to the problem at hand. It is important to keep original
models and the resulting merged model apart, and I shall adopt the term ensemble to denote the
merged model.
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Purpose of merging
We should not take the purpose behind model merging for granted. If there is to be a
point to merging two models, we must think that the ensemble has something to offer that the
original models taken in isolation do not. That is to say, we have to have a (reasonably) clear
idea what sort of job the ensemble is supposed to do, and we have to have some way of
comparing the results of original models and ensemble. I assume that the purpose, whatever it is,
must be grounded in the context. Our current context is EBP, with its focus on “what works” and
its concomitant practical reasoning.
Several of the merging methods seem to come from tasks of classification. Opitz and
Maclin (1999) thus write about combining the predictions of multiple classifiers to produce a
new classifier, an ensemble. The purpose of merging is that the ensemble should be more
accurate than any of the original classifiers when used to classify novel instances. Opitz and
Maclin (1999) discuss ensembles concerning neural networks and decision trees and conclude
that the ensemble outperforms the original models. Banerjee and Bandyopadhyay (2013) also
discuss classification; their case being classification of linguistic formulations in Bengali. Again,
the conclusion is that the merged models outperform the existing single models. From this
literature there emerges a general lesson: if we are to merge models, it must be because we think
that the ensemble performs better than the single models it is constructed from.
Here I would like to register a possible snag in our exploration of the merging of Toulmin
and Cartwright’s evidence models. At the outset the original classification models discussed by
Opitz and Maclin (1999) and Banerjee and Bandyopadhyay (2013) perform the same kind of job.
But the Toulmin and Cartwright models perform different jobs. They answer different questions
and a comparison as to their performance would not make sense. Unless they can be tweaked
into answering the same question, an aim of a better performing ensemble must be given up. But
all is not thereby necessarily lost. Recall my student experience of merged didactic models. It
indicates that the main aim of model merging was to create a (more) holistic picture of the
phenomenon at hand; holism in this case being understood to mean “several different approaches
to the same topic at once”. I shall come back to the creation of more holistic pictures
subsequently.
Match and merge
Brunet et al. (2006) list several operations one can perform on models and the following
is taken from them. These concern model management in general, but the authors do take a
special interest in model merging. The operations include consistency checks, diff, slice, split,
match, patch, transform, propagate and, of course, merge. Which of these operations we
perform, depends on the type of models in question. And on the purpose, I would like to add—
Brunet et al. (2006) seem to take that for granted. Whatever we do, we have to consider the
models themselves, their respective properties and the relationship(s) between them.
The basic operator is the merge operator; the other operations are conceived of as
supporting. Merge is defined as model x model x relationship  model (Brunet et al., 2006, p.
2); the resultant model being what I have termed an ensemble. The relationship specifies how the
models as a whole relate to one another. This is meant to be flexible, in the sense that there may
be several ways of relating models and thereby creating ensembles. Most relationships focus on
mappings between model elements; hence the importance of match. In our case the relationship
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can be described in different ways. It may, for example, be an overlap. We then employ the
supporting operator match (model x model  relationship) (Brunet et al., 2006, p. 2). Match is
used to map out common features of the models and decide if the overlap can be used as a basis
for merging the models. We have found that the Toulmin and Cartwright models share at least
one feature in common, namely the indirect role they provide for RCT evidence. Match would
give us B from the Toulmin model, and a sub-sub-premise from the Cartwright model. Typically,
Brunet et al. (2006) say, such mappings have to capture different vocabularies and preferences
for which vocabulary to use in the ensemble (p.6). It also seems to me that we face problems of
comparison. Brunet et al. (2006) use the example of two organizational charts merged into one
by using the match operator. The vocabulary issue arises because one chart uses the term
“person” and the other uses “employee”, and it is not difficult to make the judgment that these
are the same entity. But how about “backing of warrant” and “support of a sub-premise”? In
general, one common feature may seem too scant for a merge, and in our case the common
feature is located at different places in two different argument structures. On a high enough level
of abstraction these serve the same function, namely provide an indirect role for RCT evidence in
EBP. But is that sufficient for merging purposes? It is an open issue how much commonality is
required and I leave the problem open.
Let us look at the inverse strategy; to view the relationship of the original models as one
of complementarity. That is, the overlap is still there, but focus is now on concepts in each model
that are absent in the other. This is how I intuitively viewed the merging problem and also why I
initially thought that the differences between the models perhaps are more interesting than the
commonalities: their combined strengths could make up for their perceived weaknesses. I have
hinted that I take the strengths to be user friendliness, a structure with an internal logical drive,
accommodation of practice-based evidence, an indirect role of RCT evidence, accommodation of
causes as INUS conditions and space for contextual evidence that takes us from there to here.
That is to say, most aspects of the two models. A complementarity-driven merge would therefore
be practically like a total merge and the ensemble would encompass all properties and/or content
of the two original models. On the assumption that the models are compatible, the ensemble
would encompass D, W, B, Q and R as well as premises concerning an INUS condition with its
larger constellation of factors and enablers and the judgment that X can play a causal role here. It
stands to reason that the conclusions also belong to the models, so we include C and the
effectiveness prediction. I admit to having grave doubts about this possible ensemble. Where the
constituent models appear tidy with a clear internal structure, the ensemble more looks like a
jumble; and we have not even attempted to include Cartwright’s sub- and sub-sub-premises.
Brunet et al. (2006) suggest that the choice of relationship as complementary, overlapping or for
example contradictory is mostly determined by the model semantics (p. 6). I would like to
suggest that model structure might be another determinant.
Yet another possible strategy is to use the slice operator (model x criterion  model) (p.
2). Slice produces a partial view of a model, based on a given criterion. This operation allows us
to extract an aspect from one model and then match and merge to apply it to the other model.
This seems feasible if we have models that originated from different sources, which we have in
our case. But are all models amenable to slice? At least it would seem that Cartwright’s model
can be operated on in this way, given that the three major premises are independent of each
other. And interestingly, Cartwright and Hardie (2012) provide an example of what might
happen to the model if it were sliced using the role of RCT as criterion (p. 133). If the
effectiveness prediction (the conclusion) was to rely on RCT support only, the three major
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premises would be reduced to one: X can play a causal role here. The sub-premises backing up
this major premise would also be reduced to one: X played a causal role there. It is this subpremise which is supported by RCT evidence. This slice is reminiscent of Philip Davies’
evidence model in that it indicates that RCT evidence by itself is enough to bolster an
effectiveness prediction, but it is a misrepresentation of Cartwright’s original model (and
intended by Cartwright and Hardie to show how meager the grounds for an effectiveness
prediction would be if RCT evidence was all we had). I am not sure how we should incorporate
it into the Toulmin model, though. Perhaps as an extension of backing B?
Holistic understanding?
One of the possible purposes of model merging is the achievement of more holistic
understandings: an ensemble gives a truer, better, less biased, more comprehensive, etc., picture
of the phenomenon in question than the original models taken in isolation. There is obviously
something to this idea. Heitz et al. (n.d.) discuss what they call cascaded models, and the
purpose is precisely holistic understanding, in their case of a natural scene.
The context of their discussion is computer vision. Their point of departure is that to fully
understand a natural scene several sub-problems must be solved simultaneously, but when you
wish to consider them jointly you have to combine them into an ensemble. The outputs from
each problem-solving task are combined to produce high-quality pictures with scene
categorization, object detection, multi-class segmentation and depth reconstruction. These are
not simply added together. The “cascading” in question means (as I understand it) that model1
gives input to model2, which gives input to model3, etc., such that the models solve their own
problem but also help each other and thereby improve on all. The result is a holistic
understanding of the scene which is also more than the mere sum of its parts—the latter being
my interpretation.
It is not clear to me whether parts of their discussion may be sliced (sic) and incorporated
into mine. They combined models into an ensemble, but with the clear understanding at the
outset that these models are different contributions to the same large picture. In our case we have
two models which are to be understood as comprehensive in their own right, not as contributions
to some defined larger issue. To return to my student experience: if we perform complementarity
match and merge operations on the Toulmin and Cartwright models, the ensemble would
certainly increase in complexity, if only because the number of elements, factors and properties
increases. But complexity is not always a good thing; sometimes it yields mess and confusion
rather than holistic understanding. My intuition is that if the purpose of our model merging is a
more holistic view of argumentation which accommodates RCT evidence in an indirect role, the
merging operations I have discussed fail to attain it.
5. Conclusion
I have in this paper compared two models of evidence; Toulmin’s model and Cartwright’s
model. The rationale for comparing them comes from the context I have put them in: the
practical reasoning involved in evidence-based practice. Both models are argument structures
and both accommodate a crucial feature of EBP, namely the indirect function of research-based
evidence in such practical reasoning. Other than that common feature the models are very
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different, both in vocabulary and structure, and the question is whether they can possibly be
merged into an ensemble.
I have argued that they cannot. Even if the problem of different vocabularies could be
overcome, there would remain the fact that the models answer different questions. That would
not be a problem if they were different contributions to the same large picture, like in the natural
scene case, but these models are whole, comprehensive models in their own right. They also
have very different structures; one is a spiral and the other a pyramid.
For the same reasons I would also like to argue that they should not be merged. If we are
to take the trouble of making an ensemble, it must be because we have reason to think that the
ensemble is somehow better than the original models. But in this case the ensemble is not better,
I venture. In the first place it is difficult to get a picture of what such an ensemble might be like,
given the big differences between the original models. But if we try to combine them, it is no
longer clear what the question is—only that it is not “what should I do” or “will X work here.”
We would have different factors criss-crossing without a unified structure to fall into; the
original structures would presumably be destroyed in the merge.
I conclude that while there is overlap between the models—I have had a reason to
compare them in the first place— they are alternative models that solve different problems.
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